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ABSTRACT: This paper makes a critical review of  the IEA’s report entitled The Role of  Critical Minerals in 
Clean Energy Transitions. The main goal of  this report is to identify key minerals and metals that could gen-
erate supply problems and bottlenecks in a clean energy transition. The IEA establishes a series of  key recom-
mendations towards mineral security, analysing the amount of different materials used in certain technologies 
(electric cars, solar PV, onshore and offshore wind, nuclear, coal, and natural gas). Such recommendations 
include, among others, ensuring adequate investment in diversified sources of  new supply, the promotion of 
technology innovation or strategic stockpiling. This report is an essential step towards awareness rising about 
this issue, because until recently it had not received the attention it deserved. However, it falls short on the 
impact that mineral scarcity can have on the development of  economies and the planet. For this reason, we 
analyse section by section the report and provide some additional comments on aspects that could be further 
addressed to avoid replacing fossil fuel addiction with raw materials dependence.
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RESUMEN: Resumen y análisis crítico del informe especial de la Agencia Internacional de la Energía: El Rol de 
los minerales críticos en la transición hacia energías limpias. Este artículo hace una revisión crítica del informe de 
la AIE titulado El rol de los minerales críticos en la transición hacia energías limpias. El objetivo principal de 
este informe es identificar los minerales y metales clave que podrían generar problemas de suministro y cuellos 
de botella en una transición energética limpia. La AIE establece una serie de recomendaciones clave para la se-
guridad de los minerales, analizando la cantidad de diferentes materiales utilizados en determinadas tecnologías 
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(coches eléctricos, energía solar fotovoltaica, eólica terrestre y marina, nuclear, carbón y gas natural). Dichas recomendaciones 
incluyen, entre otras, garantizar una inversión adecuada en fuentes diversificadas de nuevo suministro, el fomento de la innova-
ción tecnológica o el almacenamiento estratégico. Este informe es un paso esencial para aumentar la concienciación sobre este 
tema, que hasta hace poco no había recibido la atención que merecía. Sin embargo, se queda corto en cuanto al impacto que 
la escasez de minerales puede tener en el desarrollo de las economías y del planeta. Por ello, analizamos el informe sección por 
sección y aportamos algunos comentarios adicionales sobre aspectos que podrían abordarse más a fondo para evitar sustituir 
la adicción a los combustibles fósiles por la dependencia de las materias primas.
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ORCID ID: Alicia Valero (https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3330-1793); Antonio Valero (https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0702-733X); Guio-
mar Calvo (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9263-7321)
1. INTRODUCTION
On 7 May 2021, the International Energy Agency 
presented its report: The Role of Critical Minerals in 
Clean Energy Transitions (IEA, 2021a). This document 
can be considered a milestone. Finally, such an interna-
tionally relevant organisation has acknowledged a new 
“inconvenient truth”: the energy transition is at serious 
risk due to the lack of supply of essential raw materials. 
The report is a comprehensive and up-to-date compila-
tion of a large number of studies that scholars and in-
stitutions have been developing. Indeed, for more than 
a decade now, scholars have been warning about the 
accelerated extraction of more and more minerals and 
the severe problems associated with it. However, it is 
not only the quantity extracted that is increasing, also 
the variety, and the problem is exacerbated by the new 
material requirements of the transition towards a green, 
climate neutral and digital world. 
The first question we might ask ourselves is why 
the IEA is developing a report on an aspect that seems 
alien to the field of energy at first sight. To understand 
this, it is worth noting that shortly after this report, the 
same agency presented another one: Net Zero by 2050. 
A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, which pre-
sents a comprehensive energy transformation plan to 
achieve the Paris agreements ( IEA, 2021b). 
The Roadmap sets out more than 400 milestones to 
guide the global journey to net zero by 2050. These in-
clude, from today, no investment in new fossil fuel sup-
ply projects and no further final investment decisions 
for new unabated coal plants. As a result, by 2035, 
there will be no sales of new internal combustion en-
gine passenger cars, and by 2040, the global electricity 
sector would have already reached net-zero emissions. 
This plan should ensure stable and affordable energy 
supplies, provide universal energy access, and enable 
robust economic growth.
Undertaking this ambitious plan means increasing 
current mineral consumption by at least four times (six 
times in a net-zero by 2050 scenario), which according 
to the IEA raises serious concerns about price volatility 
and security of supply of raw materials. 
This concern is visible in several strong statements 
by the IEA, moving away from the agency’s neutral 
style in its reports and making it clear that the looming 
problem is no small matter. Thus, in the presentation 
of the report, IEA executive director Fatih Birol said 
the “World faces ‘looming mismatch’ between energy 
transition and critical mineral supply”. The report also 
includes statements such as:
“The prospect of a rapid increase in demand for crit-
ical minerals – well above anything seen previously in 
most cases – raises huge questions about the availabil-
ity and reliability of supply” 
“Given the urgency of reducing emissions, this is 
a possibility that the world can ill afford.”, referring 
to the fact that there have been supply problems in the 
past which have led to price increases.
Let us now review the IEA’s critical minerals report, 
based on the studies that we have published on the sub-
ject within the CIRCE institute in recent years. We will 
differentiate the pure summary of the report from our 
comments, highlighted in italics.
2. SCOPE
The study is based on two scenarios developed 
by the IEA. The Sustainable Development Scenar-
io (SDS) and the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS). 
The first charts a pathway that fully meets the 
world’s goals to tackle climate change in line with 
the Paris Agreement; while the latter indicates where 
today’s policy measures and plans might lead the en-
ergy sector. Worth mentioning is that according to 
the IEA, the STEPS scenario falls far short of the 
world’s Paris Agreements.
The analysis is focused on a limited range of 
clean energy technologies: solar photovoltaic, on-
shore and offshore wind, concentrating solar pow-
er, hydro, geothermal and biomass, nuclear power, 
electricity networks (transmission and distribution), 
electric vehicles (EV), battery storage and hydrogen 
(electrolysers and fuels), which are the majority of 
the technologies deployed in the SDS. 
The report comprehensively reviews the technolo-
gies mentioned above, analysing future deployment, 
types, expected technological development, and ma-
terial needs for each alternative. For example, for so-
lar PV it takes into account conventional crystalline 
silicon and amorphous modules, but it also explores 
thin film technologies including CdTe, GaAs, CIGS, 
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and also perovskite solar cells. For wind energy, four 
main types of turbines are considered: gearbox dou-
ble-fed induction; gearbox permanent magnet syn-
chronous generator, direct drive permanent magnet 
synchronous generator and direct-drive electrically 
excited synchronous generator. Two main types of 
CSP technology are considered: parabolic troughs 
and central towers. Similarly, the two most com-
mon electric motor technologies for plug-in EV are 
considered: permanent-magnet and asynchronous 
induction motors. The report makes an extensive 
analysis of battery types: NCA, NCA+, NMC (111, 
333, 532, and 811), LFP, LMO, solid-state batteries, 
and even flow batteries.
Demand from other sectors was considered only 
for five focus minerals. Moreover, the analysis focuses 
on the requirements for building a plant and not on 
operational equipment. Finally, not all minerals used 
in the mentioned technologies are considered. The five 
focus minerals are cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel and 
rare earth elements. Other elements considered are: As, 
B, Cd, Ga, Ge, graphite, Hf, In, Ir, Pb, Mg, Mn, Mo, 
Nb, Pt, Se, Si, Ag, Ta, Te, Sn, Ti, W, V, Zn and Zr. For 
example, steel is not covered, as it is considered abun-
dant, and neither is Al (although aluminium demand 
is assessed for electricity networks jointly with copper). 
Industrial minerals are also out of scope.
3. MINERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CLEAN 
ENERGY TRANSITIONS
Considering this scope, the IEA predicts that to-
tal mineral demand from clean energy technologies 
is set to double in the STEPS scenario and quadru-
ple in the SDS by 2040 (see Fig. 1). In this respect, 
the IEA recognises that projected mineral demand 
is subject to considerable uncertainties, highly de-
pendent on climate policies and technological inno-
vation. This is why 11 alternative cases were built 
under both scenarios. 
EVs and battery storage are the most demand-
ing ones from all clean technologies, accounting 
for about half  of the mineral demand growth over 
the next two decades. EVs and battery storage grow 
about tenfold in the STEPS and around 30 times in 
the SDS by 2040. Coupled with the expected increase 
in demand, according to the IEA’s report, EVs use 
around six times more minerals than conventional 
vehicles (minerals included here are Cu, Li, Ni, Mn, 
Co, graphite and REEs).
In this respect, an in-depth study performed for 
different types of vehicles determined that an EV has 
a metal content that is around 33% greater than an 
ICEV (internal combustion engine vehicle) (Igle-
sias-Émbil et al., 2020). This discrepancy with the 
IEA study is because all metals were considered by 
Iglesias-Embil et al. (2020), with steel and aluminium 
being the major metals. While iron is not of concern 
because of its abundance, the alloying metals of steel 
or aluminium, including Nb, V, W, Mo, and others, are 
scarce (Ortego et al., 2020). Moreover, these alloying 
elements will become more important in new electric 
vehicles, which are looking for strong, lightweight ma-
terials to compensate for the extra weight of the bat-
teries. Furthermore, other essential metals in electron-
ic components such as Ag, In, Ta or La (Andersson et 
al., 2017), whose presence is increasing exponentially 
in all types of vehicles, should not be forgotten. The 
shortage of semiconductors has already caused severe 
economic consequences in the automotive sector and 
digital technologies in the post-Covid period. These 
tensions can be expected to become more pronounced 
due to the increasing scarcity of materials.
Back to the IEA report, electricity networks 
closely follow EVs and battery storage. They cur-
rently account for 70% of today’s mineral demand 
from energy technologies, although their share will 
fall as mainly EVs and battery storage grow. Wind 
power tops the list in the most mineral demanding 
solutions from all low carbon power generation 
FiguRe 1. Mineral demand for clean energy technologies by scenario. Steel and aluminium not included. Source: IEA (2021a). 
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technologies due to a combination of large-scale ca-
pacity additions and higher mineral intensity, espe-
cially coming from offshore wind. Without consid-
ering steel, aluminium, or concrete, the IEA reports 
that wind energy requires about nine times more 
mineral resources than a gas-fired power plant, as 
shown in Fig. 2 (25 times more if all raw materials 
are accounted for, according to Valero et al. (2018b)).
Solar PV follows closely, while hydropower, bi-
omass, nuclear and hydrogen-based technologies 
make only minor contributions given their compar-
atively low mineral requirements and modest capac-
ity. Clean energy technologies will monopolise the 
demand for various minerals, including copper and 
REE, with a share of 40% and 60-70% for nickel 
and cobalt and almost 90% for lithium by 2040 in 
the SDS (see Fig. 2).
Copper, graphite, and nickel dominate mineral 
demand by weight. Yet lithium will experience the 
most significant growth in demand with respect to 
today’s levels. In the SDS scenario, lithium might in-
crease its demand forty times, graphite, cobalt, and 
nickel between twenty and twenty-five times, copper 
twenty times, and rare earths seven times (see Fig. 
1).
That said, demand projections are subject to 
large variations depending on how technologies 
evolve. This uncertainty is especially significant 
when it comes to mineral demand for the future mix 
of EV battery chemistries. For instance, lithium de-
mand by 2040 might be “only” 13 times higher if  
vanadium redox flow batteries rapidly penetrate the 
market in the STEPS, or 51 times higher if  all sol-
id-state batteries commercialise faster than expected 
in the SDS. 
All in all, and despite considering an increase in 
the capacity factor and a likely reduction in mate-
rial use for all clean technologies, there will be an 
unprecedented increase of raw material use in the 
coming decades. This, in turn, could lead to higher 
mineral prices and become a serious obstacle in the 
deployment of clean technologies. The report shows 
an example of this effect: “a doubling of lithium or 
nickel prices would induce a 6% increase in battery 
costs, what would eat up the anticipated learning ef-
fects associated with a doubling capacity” and “the 
continued cost decline of batteries at a pace ob-
served during the past decade cannot be taken for 
granted without a further acceleration in technology 
innovation”.
4. RAW MATERIALS SUPPLY RISKS
From the supply side, the IEA evaluates wheth-
er the expected growth in raw material demand (in 
most cases well above the historical pace), can be 
satisfied reliably and sustainably. The analysis has 
been focused on only five minerals: copper, lithium, 
nickel, cobalt, and rare earths. According to the re-
port, some elements such as lithium and cobalt are 
expected to be in surplus in the near term. However, 
some of their refined products such as lithium hy-
droxide, battery-grade nickel, and neodymium or 
dysprosium might face supply bottlenecks in the 
coming years as demand rises. That said, projected 
demand surpasses the expected supply in the me-
dium term from existing mines and projects under 
construction for most minerals. This means that 
meeting primary demand implies strong growth in 
investment to bring new supply sources over the next 
decade. In this respect, several risks need to be taken 
into account: 1) higher geographical concentration 
of production; 2) a mismatch between the pace of 
change in demand and the typical project develop-
ment timeline; 3) the effects of declining resource 
quality; 4) growing scrutiny of environmental and 
social performance of production and 5) higher ex-
posure to climate risk such as water stress, among 
others.
The first risk, which is usually considered in the 
FiguRe 2. Minerals used in selected clean energy technologies. Steel and aluminium not included. Source: IEA (2021a). The 
Role of  Critical Minerals in the Energy Transition. All rights reserved. 
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elaboration of critical raw material lists by govern-
ments, recognises that a few countries control the 
production of key elements in the clean energy tran-
sition, which is unlikely to change in the near term. 
For example, three-quarters of the world’s produc-
tion of Li, Co, and REE are controlled by only three 
countries (see Fig. 3). The Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) and China were responsible for 
some 70% and 60% of global production of cobalt 
and rare earth elements, respectively, in 2019. More-
over, China not only concentrates the extraction of 
key raw materials, but it also leads the processing 
of these minerals (i.e., providing nearly 90% of rare 
earth elements, 70% of Co or 60% of Li). China is 
also investing in overseas assets in Australia, Chile, 
the DRC or Indonesia, as part of its “Made in China 
2025” initiative. For example, Chinese strategic in-
vestment overseas includes near 24% of the Chilean 
company SQM or 51% of Australia’s Greenbushes 
lithium mine. This issue makes the system vulnerable 
to political instability, geopolitical risks and possible 
export restrictions. Notable cases of this vulnerabil-
ity were experienced with the Chinese REE export 
embargo in 2010 or, more recently, Indonesia’s ban 
on nickel ore exports in January 2020. Hence, there 
is an urgent need to diversify the extraction and fur-
ther processing of essential raw materials.
However, to develop projects from discovery 
to first production takes over 16 years on average, 
which exacerbates the risk of a mismatch in timing 
between demand and the industry’s ability to bring 
on new projects.
Another key question is whether there are enough 
resources in the crust to satisfy this increasing de-
mand. According to the IEA, economically viable 
reserves have been increasing for many energy tran-
sition minerals. Among others, this has been the case 
for lithium reserves, which increased by 30% in the 
last ten years. IEA’s concerns about resources relate 
then to quality rather than quantity. For example, 
the average copper ore grade in Chile decreased by 
30% over the last 15 years. 
Lower ore grades imply more energy, waste rock 
produced and more emissions. This issue was point-
ed out by several studies such as Calvo et al. (2016) 
and Mudd (2007) already alerting about the expected 
exponential energy and waste rock increase in mining 
operations. Technological improvement that allows 
the exploitation of lower-grade deposits might par-
tially offset these higher costs. However, as stated by 
Domínguez and Valero (2013), where historical data 
sets of 17 major gold producing countries were ana-
lysed, although progress in technology has been made, 
in most cases, energy requirements are increasing be-
cause the primary variable is the ore grade. Hence, if 
extractive industries continue relying on fossil fuels, it 
is not clear that decarbonisation will occur at the pace 
it is expected since this issue has not been sufficiently 
addressed in current energy transition scenarios.
The IEA also warns about the production peak 
of current mines, specifically for copper, due to de-
clining ore quality and reserves exhaustion. In our 
view, concerns should not only relate to quality, which 
is justified, but also to quantity. In Calvo et al. (2017), 
we demonstrated that the peak of a dozen commodi-
ties based on resources data (i.e., most optimistic val-
ues regarding mineral availability) might be reached 
before 2050. Using lithium as a case study, the influ-
ence on the fluctuations on extractable resources was 
analysed, stating that the peak is only delayed less 
than two decades even if the most optimistic resources 
values are doubled.
Deep-sea mining could be developed as a response 
to declining high-grade deposits on land. However, 
there are economic, technical, and environmental 
hurdles, such as seafloor disturbance or sediment 
plumes which irreversibly affect ecosystems. Ac-
cording to the IEA, proper regulatory measures for 
FiguRe 3. Share of  top three producing countries in production of  selected minerals and fossil fuels (2019). Source: IEA 
(2021a). The Role of  Critical Minerals in the Energy Transition. All rights reserved. 
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deep-sea mining should be put into place after more 
rigorous impact assessments.
The growing scrutiny of environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) issues is, in fact, another risk 
in the supply of essential mineral resources. Miner-
al extraction affects the local and regional environ-
ment because it implies land use change, large vol-
umes of water, waste generation, air pollution from 
particulate matter, gaseous emissions, and noise 
pollution. For example, over 10 square kilometres 
of Bayan Obo, a mining town in China, and the soil 
surrounding it is highly enriched with heavy metals. 
Effective waste management policies can reduce the 
risks to the environment and public health. Such 
is the case of the European Union’s Directive on 
Management of Waste from Extractive Industries, 
2006/21EC, which requires the use of the best avail-
able techniques to reduce the volume of extractive 
waste. In the same line, the “Initiative for Responsi-
ble Mining Assurance” outlines requirements relat-
ed to the management of air contaminants.
The report does not hide the worrying social 
impacts of mining and that there are many causes 
for this so-called “resource curse”. Corruption and 
misuse of government resources (almost 20% of 
bribery cases occurred in the extractive sector), fa-
talities and injuries to workers and members of the 
public, human rights abuses including child labour 
and unequal impacts on women and rights are also 
risks that may lead to supply disruption and could 
slow the pace of clean energy transitions. Artisanal 
and small-scale mining (ASM) is of particular con-
cern, with cobalt especially vulnerable. ASM is often 
unregulated and might imply unsafe conditions for 
workers and the presence of child labour. Accord-
ing to a survey of cobalt ASM workers in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, only 2 of 58 sites used 
protective equipment for workers and only in 2019, 
60 fatal accidents and over 100 accidents involving 
injury were registered. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that a growing 
number of consumers and investors are requesting 
companies to disclose targets and action plans. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
is an example to support the development of trans-
parency practices. Yet tightening scrutiny of ESG is-
sues might have an impact on costs and supply pros-
pects. Moreover, adopting transparency processes 
may not necessarily reduce corruption because in-
formation should also reach the public and sanction 
corrupt conduct. This is not a minor issue, as, for 
example, around 10-15% of Cu, Li, and Co-produc-
tion and almost 50% of nickel in 2019 came from 
regions with low governance scores and high emis-
sions intensity. 
The so-called Nimby effect (Not in my backyard) 
reflects the growing scrutiny of ESG issues. This is nota-
bly relevant for most countries in Europe. There is much 
rejection of the opening of new mines because of the 
environmental and social effects they cause. However, 
Europe is highly dependent on external mining supplies, 
and one of its strategies is to invest in domestic extrac-
tion. In Spain, for example, there is strong opposition to 
the opening of Li mines in Cáceres or rare earth mines 
in Ciudad Real because the deposits are located in plac-
es of high ecological value or close to urban centres. 
Moreover, as stated by the IEA, processing REE often 
generates toxic and radioactive materials, which could 
eventually leak into groundwater, causing major health 
and safety issues.
The last risk pointed out by the report is exposure 
to climate risks. Mining activity is also affected by 
climate change. Water stress combined with a high-
er water intensity in ore processing has brought the 
critical importance of sustainable water sourcing to 
attention. Copper and lithium are particularly vul-
nerable as they are mined in areas with high water 
stress (i.e., 80% of copper output in Chile is pro-
duced in arid areas). Additionally, mining activity 
is exposed to other forms of climate risk, including 
extreme heat and flooding, which pose challenges to 
ensuring reliable and sustainable supplies. It is well 
known that flooding can lead to spills of hazardous 
waste and tailings dam failure. For example, tailings 
storage facility at Vale’s mine in Brumadinho, Bra-
zil, led to mining waste surging across the surround-
ing areas and the death of over 270 people. Brazil 
had already experienced the collapse of the Fundão 
dam, which released 43 million cubic metres of iron 
ore tailings, polluting 668 km of watercourses from 
the Doce River to the Atlantic Ocean. To avoid such 
catastrophes, the so-called “Global Industry Stand-
ard on Tailings Management” was established. 
5. CLIMATE ADVANTAGES OF CLEAN ENER-
GY TECHNOLOGIES
According to the IEA, emissions from minerals 
development do not negate the climate advantages 
of clean energy technologies. The IEA supports this 
statement through a comparative life-cycle GHG 
emissions assessment of a mid-size battery electric 
vehicle - BEV (NMC 622 – 0.19 kWh/km) with re-
spect to an internal combustion engine car - ICE 
(6.8 Lge/100 km). The study assumes two scenari-
os, with different GHG emissions intensity for bat-
tery minerals (70 kg/ CO2-eq/kWh vs 35 kg CO2-eq/
kWh). The analysis considers today’s manufacturing 
lines assuming dynamic global average grid carbon 
intensity in the SDS. As can be seen in Fig. 4, for a 
life cycle of 200.000 km, CO2 emissions for the ICE 
almost double those by BEV in both scenarios. In 
a high-carbon electricity mix (800 g CO2-eq/kWh), 
BEV’s emissions are still under those from ICE.
That said, the IEA also recognises that energy 
transition minerals involve higher GHG emission 
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intensities. For example, producing neodymium 
oxide implies near 80 t CO2-eq/ton, for cobalt sul-
phate over 15, whereas for iron and steel about 2 t 
CO2-eq/ton (see Fig. 4). Moreover, as demand for 
energy transition minerals spirals up, new resources 
and processing routes with higher GHG emissions 
intensities will increase their share. For example, 
more and more nickel will need to be produced from 
laterites instead of from sulphide ores. Depending 
on the processing route (matte via nickel pig iron or 
high-pressure acid leaching), emissions increase be-
tween 1.5 and 5 times respectively, when compared 
to nickel production from sulphides. In the same 
way, producing lithium hydroxide or carbonate from 
hardrock implies that the emissions intensity triples 
with respect to producing them from brines.
Considering the vehicle as a proxy for not negating 
the climate advantage of clean energy technologies 
might seem to be a bold simplification. However, ac-
cording to our studies, the vehicle is actually the clean 
technology that is most dependent on materials, both in 
quantity and variety (Ortego et al., 2020). Therefore, 
although it is a very reductionist approach, it may be 
valid, considering that all other technologies consume 
comparatively less resources, especially accounting 
for their whole life cycle. However, there is one aspect 
that is not being taken into account in IEA’s report. If 
mines continue to be depleted, which is highlighted in 
the study itself, the energy associated with the mining 
of metals in vehicles can be expected to increase con-
siderably. Moreover, the new generations of vehicles 
(BEV and ICEV) incorporate more electronics and 
therefore many other materials in addition to those 
included in batteries. This is why the overall emissions 
balance will have to be recalculated taking these facts 
into account. Several methodologies, including the 
thermodynamic rarity approach as proposed by the 
authors, could be eventually used to consider resource 
depletion (Sonderegger et al., 2020).
Therefore, it becomes essential that extractive 
processes urgently reduce their carbon footprint 
because “minerals are needed for clean energy tran-
sitions, and sustainable mineral development need 
energy”. The carbon footprint of the electricity mix 
has a significant impact on mineral production, as 
an important part of the energy demand is in the 
form of electricity (i.e. comminution consumes 
about 3% of the electricity consumed in the world). 
Hence low-carbon electricity but also fuel switching, 
and energy efficiency will reduce GHG emissions as-
sociated with mineral production in the near term. 
According to the report, shifting all fuels to natural 
gas would bring emissions down by 10%, while us-
ing renewable-based electricity reduces CO2 intensi-
ty by about two-thirds. 
Net CO2 emission reduction pledges for top 20 
mining companies (accounting for 25% of cobalt 
and less than 20% for copper and nickel) are in the 
range of 30% by 2030. Yet, many more companies 
need to come on board to follow a sustainable de-
velopment path.
6. IS RECYCLING THE SOLUTION?
Metal recycling is also considered a source of sec-
ondary supply. However, IEA’s report does not go 
into much detail on this topic. Instead, it very much 
focuses on battery recycling and dedicates a small 
section to grid recycling. 
The main conclusion drawn from the analysis for 
battery recycling is that recycling from Li-ion bat-
teries can relieve a proportion of the burden from 
mining them from virgin ores. However, this does 
not eliminate the need for continued investment in 
primary supply of minerals. Secondary production 
from recycled minerals would account for up to 
12% of total supply requirements for cobalt, 7% for 
nickel, and 5% for lithium and copper, in a scenario 
FiguRe 4. Average GHG emissions for certain commodities and life-cycle GHG emissions of  a BEV (battery electric vehicle) 
and ICE (internal combustion engine) vehicle. Source: IEA (2021a). The Role of  Critical Minerals in the Energy Transition. All 
rights reserved.
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where the collection rate increases to 80% by 2040 
gradually. Reused batteries would contribute to a re-
duction of only 1-2% of total supply requirements 
by 2040. There are still many technological and 
commercial challenges to overcome. Li-ion battery 
recycling has yet to reach maturity. 
Technology bottlenecks include, among others, 
the lack of standardisation of design, with vehicle 
manufacturing adopting different battery chem-
istries without disclosing information of their cell 
designs. In addition, there are no specific guidelines 
or regulations for discharging, disassembling, and 
storing spent batteries. Transport logistics is anoth-
er challenge, and more stringent safety measures to 
handle and transport batteries are required. The re-
port cites the European Union Global Battery Alli-
ance in 2017 as an example. The proposal sets out 
minimum levels of recycled content of 12% Co, 4% 
Li, 4% Ni by 2030, as for material recovery, 90% for 
Co, Cu, and Ni, and 35% for Li by 2026. In addi-
tion, batteries sold in the European Union will carry 
a carbon intensity performance label and comply 
with carbon footprint thresholds.
In Valero et al. (2018a), we evaluated the recycling 
rates needed to avoid identified material constraints 
(i.e. where annual demand is expected to exceed pro-
duction). Our results showed that the recycling rate of 
all lithium in the technosphere (not only that included 
in batteries) should increase to 4,8% by 2050, which is 
probably feasible. However, in the case of Co and Ni, 
it should reach 59% and 41%, respectively. 
In addition to batteries and grid recycling, poten-
tial secondary sources include tailings from process-
ing, scrap used in manufacturing and fabrication, 
and other end-of-life products. Enhanced metals 
recovery from mining and processing waste is seen 
as a clear opportunity to increase supply. Moreover, 
this would also reduce the risk of hazardous mate-
rials entering the environment. The Kiruna iron ore 
mine tailings in Sweden could constitute an essential 
source of REEs for the European Union. The Boron 
mine in the United States could become an eventual 
source of lithium from waste rock. Bauxite residue 
is also a potential source of REEs, titanium and va-
nadium. In contrast, fine-grained landfilled sludges, 
iron-rich sludges from metal production (from Zn 
production) and fayalitic slag (mostly from Cu pro-
duction) could yield additional volumes of Zn, Ni, 
Cu, Co and others.
As mentioned, the opening of new mines in Europe 
will face strong opposition. Yet, it has been proven 
that mine tailings from existing or abandoned mines 
could become a valuable source of essential minerals. 
This is the case, for instance, of the old Zinc Penouta 
mine in Spain, which tailings are now a source of nio-
bium and tantalum (Rodríguez et al., 2020) 
Recycling end-of-life products still face many 
challenges that prevent it from being a significant 
source of raw materials. Barriers include competi-
tion from primary supply, information deficits and 
limited waste collection. Physical collection is a pri-
mary limiting factor. Bulk products and materials 
including aluminium, iron, nickel or copper have 
traditionally achieved high rates of recycling and 
have a higher potential for maintaining global stock. 
That said, many new products such as personal elec-
tronics or alloyed materials make physical and met-
allurgical separation difficult. For instance, new iron 
and copper alloys may require the physical, chem-
ical and metallurgical separation of over 50 mate-
rials with different thermodynamic and metallurgic 
considerations from a single product. An addition-
al challenge is that minerals that enter stock today 
may not be recoverable for decades. Moreover, most 
critical minerals lack information and description 
of stock. Technologies must therefore adapt to the 
stock life and the nature of the stock’s evolving ther-
modynamic and metallurgical properties. 
At this point, the IEA report acknowledges the prob-
lem that some of us thermodynamicists have pointed 
out: metal mixology implies irrecoverable losses at the 
End of Life (Reuter et al., 2006; Valero, and Valero, 
2019). This challenge is essential because recoverabil-
ity depends on how the metals are mixed, alloyed, etc. 
According to the second law of thermodynamics, the 
greater the degree of material mixing in a product, 
the larger the irreversibility and thus the losses gener-
ated at the end-of-life. That is why it would be more 
rigorous to speak of a “spiral economy” rather than 
a “circular economy”. One hundred percent recycling 
is impossible from a second law point of view (cir-
cles can never be closed). Yet losses can be minimised 
through eco-design and appropriate technologies. 
Policy intervention may be necessary to build 
demand for secondary supply. In this respect, many 
countries have already set recycling rate targets for 
consumer products (notably for end-of-life-vehicles 
and electronic waste). However, as these are mostly 
based on weight and volume metrics, companies will 
likely focus on high-volume materials more readily 
recyclable than those found in small quantities.
Indeed, this is an issue stated, for instance, in cars. 
As we pointed out in Ortego et al. (2018) in the Eu-
ropean Union, from 2015, the total mass percentage 
of materials reused and recovered with respect to the 
average car’s weight must be equal to 95%, and 85% 
must come from reuse and recycling. However, End-
of-Life Vehicles (ELV) recycling operations main-
ly focus on recycling major metals such as steel and 
aluminium alloys, with many other metals not func-
tionally recycled (Ortego et al., 2018). Moreover, all 
types of steel are mixed and smelted, the result be-
ing low-quality steel. Consequently, not insignificant 
quantities of virgin materials need to be added to ob-
tain the desired quality of steel. Hence, even though 
part of these scarce materials may be recycled eventu-
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ally, only a tiny proportion is recycled back into cars. 
Ortego et al. (2018) calculated that from four recy-
cled ELV, the metals of one become effectively lost, if 
metal loss is assessed in terms of a physical parameter 
that accounts for scarcity and energy intensities re-
quired to mine and refine the metals. 
Other important measures to revitalise the sec-
ondary supply of raw materials include: support-
ing the development of collection and sorting pro-
grammes (such as deposit-refund schemes already in 
place in Denmark for nickel-cadmium batteries); de-
veloping knowledge of global and regional stocks; 
market incentives; collaboration, often beyond 
country borders; to encourage secondary market 
development; and incentivising manufacturers to 
develop products that are easier to recycle. Another 
option is implementing extended producer respon-
sibility, where the manufacturer is made responsi-
ble for the treatment or disposal of post-consumer 
products.
We find this last point particularly key for increas-
ing not only recycling rates but also reuse rates. If this 
measure is effectively implemented, manufacturers 
would be encouraged to eco-design products to facili-
tate recycling. The aim would be to develop long-last-
ing and robust products with a modular design and 
avoiding the use of scarce materials. This would also 
encourage final users to maximise the useful life of 
products and discard them only when necessary and 
not just thinking about what is fashionable. Further-
more, Incentivising users through eco-credits and sim-
ilar campaigns could benefit society and the system 
(Valero et al., 2021).
For packaging, European companies usually join 
integrated waste management systems transferring 
the problem to third parties. However, such systems 
that have shown weaknesses for packaging recycling 
in some instances, will be less suitable for recovering 
minor but valuable metals, if producers are not effec-
tively engaged. Moreover, there are very few facili-
ties in the world able to recover such minor metals. 
For example, Europe, which presumably is very well 
positioned in the global recycling ranking, does not 
even have one facility per country. The result is that 
e-waste needs to be exported to other countries, and a 
not-insignificant quantity arrives in China.
7. IEA’s SIX PILLARS OF A COMPREHENSIVE 
APPROACH TO MINERAL SECURITY
The report identifies six pillars to minerals secu-
rity: 1) ensuring adequate investment in diversified 
sources of new supply; 2) promoting technology 
innovation at all points along the value chain; 3) 
scaling up recycling; 4) enhancing supply chain re-
silience and market transparency; 5) mainstreaming 
higher environmental and social standards; and 6) 
strengthening international collaboration between 
producers and consumers.
The IEA states that the foremost action to ensure 
adequacy of supply is to provide clear and strong 
signals about energy transitions because the largest 
uncertainty around demand comes from questions 
about countries’ real commitments to their climate 
ambitions. Companies will not invest in new pro-
jects if  they do not have confidence in countries’ 
climate ambitions, what could create bottlenecks, 
given the long lead times for new projects. Addi-
tional mentioned measures include strengthening 
national geological surveys, streamlining permitting 
procedures to shorten lead times, providing financ-
ing support to de-risk certain strategic projects or 
support enhanced metals recovery from low-grade 
ores, waste streams or abandoned mines. Moreover, 
governments can work to improve data availability 
and comparability across regions while raising pub-
lic acceptance.
The second pillar is related to innovation in de-
mand-side technology as it could mitigate upward 
cost pressure of clean technologies. The report 
shows as an example the reductions achieved in sil-
ver and silicon use for solar cells or technology ad-
vances in aluminium to help ease strains on copper 
and later on tin supply. Innovation in production 
and processing technologies are also important to 
unlock sizeable amounts of new supplies. For exam-
ple, direct lithium extraction or enhanced metal re-
covery from waste streams or low-grade ores could 
increase supply volumes. Technologies can also help 
reduce energy and water consumption, while bring-
ing environmental and operational benefits.
Scaling up recycling is the third pillar. The IEA 
states that it can reduce primary supply require-
ments and alleviate the environmental burdens as-
sociated with mineral supply. Yet recycling must be 
incentivised by governments, supporting collection 
and sorting activities and funding R&D into new re-
cycling technologies.
Enhancing supply chain resilience and market 
transparency is recognised to be the fourth pillar. 
Indeed, a bottleneck in processing capacity could 
elevate prices for refined products, while a higher 
degree of concentration of production implies that 
disruption can have wider ripple impacts on the en-
tire value chain. The IEA suggests making period-
ic stress-tests and emergency response exercises to 
identify points of potential weakness and devise 
required actions to mitigate such risks. Strategic 
stockpiling is also identified as a potential measure 
to enhance supply chain resilience. In addition, the 
establishment of reliable price benchmarks through 
a standardised methodology could increase market 
transparency. This is especially important for minor 
but essential minerals (such as lithium or cobalt) 
usually traded on a bilateral basis, with low pricing 
transparency and liquidity.
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As previously explained, poor environmental and 
social performance can also lead to supply disrup-
tion. Therefore, the following coordinated policy 
efforts will need to be put in place: i) provide techni-
cal and political support to countries seeking to im-
prove legal and regulatory practices; (ii) to incentiv-
ise producers to adopt more sustainable operational 
practices (and so new entrants will have an incentive 
to develop new approaches to mitigate such risks); 
and (iii) to ensure that companies across the supply 
chain undertake due diligence to identify, assess and 
mitigate these risks. 
The last pillar involves strengthening interna-
tional cooperation, since given the complexity of 
the mineral supply chains, no individual country 
will be able to drive the required changes on its 
own. As of  yet, there is no overarching internation-
al governance framework for critical minerals and 
coordinated policy action is lacking. A multilateral 
framework could: ensure reliable and sustainable 
mineral supply by providing clear market signals 
on decarbonisation targets; facilitate dialogue be-
tween producers and consumers; mobilise public 
funds to accelerate R&D efforts for innovation; 
conduct assessments of  potential vulnerabilities 
across the supply chains and discuss collective ac-
tion to respond to potential disruption; promote 
knowledge and capacity transfer to spread sus-
tainable and responsible development practices; 
strengthen environmental and social performance 
standards; coordinate diplomatic efforts to prevent 
restrictive export policies; and collect reliable data 
for informed decision-making.
8. CONCLUSIONS
 - In our view, while comprehensively summaris-
ing and revealing uncomfortable truths about 
raw material production and availabilitty, the 
report falls short on the impact that mineral 
scarcity can have on the development of econo-
mies and the planet. Dependence on critical raw 
materials and their primary extraction in mines 
could jeopardise the future of the energy tran-
sition. Europe and the developed world will not 
avoid the effects of climate change by wanting 
to produce all their energy in a clean way unless 
a hard look at their dependence on critical raw 
materials is taken. Consequently, the criticality 
of raw materials must be put on the agenda of 
all institutions, as there will be no energy transi-
tion if there is no material transition. Therefore, 
the energy transition must necessarily go hand in 
hand with the circular – rather spiral- economy.
 - Countries should promote companies that 
effectively recover raw materials and reintro-
duce them into the system. Particular atten-
tion should be paid to rare materials and with 
identified supply risks. Governments should 
establish legal mechanisms to make producers 
responsible for recycling their products, avoid 
planned obsolescence and favour the repair of 
products. Cities should selectively collect waste 
of electrical and electronic equipment (includ-
ing that in cars), batteries, and obsolete renew-
able technologies. 
 - However, as discussed above, at the current rate 
of mineral consumption, even if  recycling rates 
of critical minerals significantly improve, the 
economy will still rely on mining. Therefore, 
society must be informed of the gravity of this 
problem, but at the same time, the populations 
affected by new mines must be respected and 
adequately compensated with an intergenera-
tional vision. 
 - The six pillars proposed in the IEA report for 
securing mineral supply imply a green-tinted 
“business as usual” economy. As the IEA points 
out, there is no energy transition without min-
erals, but without energy, there are no miner-
als. This problem is compounded by the severe 
social and environmental problems that mining 
often entails and the enormous complexity and 
opacity of highly globalised raw material sup-
ply chains. For example, we are currently seeing 
problems of shortages of semiconductors made 
up of some of these elements that have disrupt-
ed or slowed down the production of cars and 
household appliances. The social result is that 
many workers may lose their jobs.
 - The measures proposed in the report are 
necessary, although some of  them, such as 
strategic stockpiling, are debatable as they 
could stress inequalities between countries 
and cause socio-political tensions. Arguably, 
the solutions proposed by the IEA, if  suc-
cessfully implemented, will postpone by a few 
decades what is already an open secret: an 
exponential increase in resource extraction is 
incompatible with a finite planet. This is the 
big message missing from the report. Curb-
ing the accelerated degradation of  resources 
by drastically reducing consumption should 
be the first pillar to avoid any future materi-
al disruptions and, most importantly, further 
damage to the Earth.
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